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The objective of this paper is to examine the potential impacts of crop insurance on 
farm economic structure using Nebraska county level data from 1980-1998.  Using a 
profit function we fit input demand and output supply equations accounting for 
insurance premiums and indemnities to examine the economic impacts of crop 
insurance. 
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POTENTIAL EFFECTS OF CROP INSURANCE ON FARM 
ECONOMIC STRUCTURE 
SALEEM SHAIK AND JOSEPH ATWOOD 
 
Crop insurance, one of U. S. Department of Agriculture’s primary policy 
instrument in protecting farmers against risk has been the subject of substantial 
research. The Federal Crop Insurance Corporation through the Risk Management 
Agency offers several crop insurance policies (Multli-Peril Crop Insurance, Crop 
Revenue Coverage, Revenue Assurance, Income Protection and Group Risk 
Protection) relying on private companies for product delivery, service, and loss 
adjustment.  With the Freedom to Farm act of 1996, crop insurance has become much 
more important as a farm policy instrument and replacing others as the principal 
means of managing risk.  While the causes of the switch to crop insurance are still 
controversial, as are the predicted outcomes, there is strong interest in the potential 
economic effects on resource use and production mix leading to important policy 
implications. 
Several aspects of crop insurance has been examined related to moral hazard 
(Chambers, 1989; Just and Calvin, 1993; Coble et al, 1997), adverse selection 
(Atwood and Shaik, 1999; Just and Calvin, 1995; Skees and Reed, 1986; Quiggin et 
al, 1994), demand for crop insurance (Coble et al, 1996), rating methodologies 
(Olivier Mahul, 1999; Goodwin and Ker, 1998; Skees, Black and Barnett, 1997; 
Goodwin, 1993) and the effects of insurance availability upon resource allocation 
(Horowitz and Lichtenberg, 1993; Atwood et al, 1996; Smith and Goodwin, 1996).  
Current research had addressed crop-specific effects of insurance programs on farm   3
economic structure, including adverse selection, moral hazard, demand for insurance, 
rating methodologies, and the potential environmental effects.  This line of research is 
valid due to the current setting of insurance programs that is crop specific.  In general, 
the effects of crop insurance effects encompass a simultaneous impact on the farm 
economic structure -resource use and output production mix rather then in isolation to 
individual crops.  The effects on farm economic structure encompass the following 
question--would the premiums and indemnities influence the producer decision to 
alter factor use patterns and output production mix.  A producer or firm’s objective is 
to maximize profits without crop insurance can be represented as π =− pYw X .  With 
crop insurance the profit can be represented as πζ =+ −− pY I Y wX Y () () ,  w h e r e  
IY Y () () and ζ  represents the indemnities received and premiums paid respectively.  
For this analysis Nebraska was specifically chosen due to the availability of output, 
input and crop insurance data for corn, soybean and wheat data which together 
accounts for 77% of the insured acres in the state of Nebraska for the year 1999. 
Specifically we examine the influence of crop insurance premium and 
indemnity received on the use of capital, labor, chemicals and other inputs leading to 
potential changes in the production mix between insured crops, non-insured crops and 
livestock.  An earlier state-level analysis seems to poorly identify the implications of 
crop insurance on the farm economic structure due to the use of aggregate data and 
short time series.  In this paper we attempt to examine the potential economic effects 
of crop insurance premiums and indemnities received on resource use and output 
production mix using Nebraska county level data from 1980-1999. 
The paper is organized into the following sections.  In the next section, the 
theoretical and the econometric model based on the profit function along with system   4
of input (includes capital, farm labor, capital, chemicals and other input) and output 
[included are corn, wheat, soybean, other crops and livestock) equations are 
presented.  The construction of the output, input, crop insurance policy premiums and 
policy indemnities index for Nebraska agriculture counties for the time period 1980-
1997 are detailed in the third section.  The results are presented in the fourth section 
illustrating the potential impacts of crop insurance on farm economic structure.   
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J =∈ ℜ + ( , ,..., ) 12 .  A producer or firm’s (in our case, Nebraska agriculture 
sector) objective is to maximize profits with input quantity () X  and price () w  vector 
capable of producing output quantity () Y  and the price () p  vector.  So profit in the 
absence of crop insurance can be represented as π =− pYw X .  With aggregate 
county data
1, profit can be represented as πζ =+ −− pY I Y wX Y () () ,  w h e r e  
IY Y () () and ζ  represents the indemnities received and premiums paid respectively.  
Since the insurance is yield-acreage driven policy, the premiums, subsidies, and 
indemnities revolve around the actual
2 or expected yield and net insured acres for the 
producer.  To this effect, the first step involves adjusting the county-level aggregated   5
crop insurance premiums and indemnities received in the individual crop’s revenue.  
In the second step a premium (zero if crop insurance premium was not purchased and 
one other wise) and indemnity dummy (one if received an indemnity payment and 
zero other wise) generated are used in the system of input demand and output supply. 
Due to the separable assumption, it is possible to examine the aggregate 
effects of crop insurance on factor use patterns and output production mix 
independently.  Utilizing Shephard’s lemma, the cost minimizing derived input 
demands including crop insurance policy premiums examines the potential effects of 
crop insurance on the factor use patterns.  Similarly utilizing Shephard’s, the revenue
3 
maximizing output supply including policy indemnities examines the effects of crop 
insurance on output production mix.  The cost function C wY ( , ) and the revenue 
function R p X ( , ) satisfying the properties as defined in Chambers (1988) under non-
Hicks neutral technical change are postulated.  Alternatively the system of input and 
output equations can be represented by a Translog profit function as 
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The required cost and revenue shares for estimating the system of input 
demand and output supply equations can be derived using net profit (NP) 
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where CS =cost shares,  RS =revenue shares, wi =input prices,  pi=input prices, 
xi =input quantity and  yj =output quantity.  Due to the use of net profit, the revenue 
shares should be positive and the cost shares should be negative with the sum of 
revenue and cost shares equal to one.  The logarithmic first order conditions of the 
profit function provides the system of input demand and output supply equations for 
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where the DP is the individual crop specific dummies for premiums  and DI is the 
individual crop-specific dummies for indemnities and the remain variables are defined 
in equation (2).  Symmetry and linear homogeneity in input (output) prices are 
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NEBRASKA COUNTY LEVEL INPUT, OUTPUT AND CROP INSURANCE DATA 
 
Nebraska agriculture input, output and crop insurance data for the period 
1980-98 was constructed from the various sources.  The output data are constructed 
utilizing three different sources – National Agricultural Statistical Service (NASS) 
county level yield and acreage, state level price data; Census of Agriculture data (for 
the following years, 1982, 1987, 1992 and 1997); and the Regional Economics 
Information System, database, 1969-98 published by Bureau of Economic Analysis 
(BEA).  The cash receipts shares of the three insured crops – corn, wheat and soybean 
are obtained from the Census data and time series shares are generated using linear 
interpolation.  These shares are then applied to the county level crop cash receipts 
data to obtain the insured crop cash receipts.  Dividing the cash receipts with county 
level yields should provide the crop specific implicit price index. 
The input data on capital, hired farm labor, chemicals and other inputs are 
obtained from the Regional Economics Information System, database, 1969-98 
published by Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA).  State level quantity index is used 
in the construction of an implicit price index for each of the inputs at the county level.  
The construction of the price and quantity indexes was borrowed from Shaik (1998) 
for the relevant year, 1980-1998.  However for this paper we use data from 1980-
1997.  The five output price indexes are corn, wheat, soybean, other crops and 
livestock.  Similarly four implicit input price indexes are also constructed for capital 
(land and capital), labor, chemicals and other inputs.  Aggregate crop insurance 
premium and indemnity are adjusted in the individual crop’s revenue for the insured 
crops – corn, wheat and soybean.   8
The Risk Management Agency (RMA) complies data on the quantity (number 
of) and cost of crop insurance policy premiums and indemnities paid based on the 
insurance type and coverage for each crop, aggregate at the county level for the time 
period 1980-1997.  Utilizing these county data, the state data is computed for each of 
the three major crops grown in Nebraska that constitutes 77 percent of the total crop 
insurance policies issued in 1999.  A crop insurance premium quantity index is 
constructed by share weighted average of the number of policy premiums across the 
three crops.  Similarly a crop insurance indemnity quantity index is constructed by 
share weighted average of the number of policy indemnities across the three crops.  
Finally the aggregate output and input quantity indexes are used to adjusted the crop 
insurance indemnities and premiums respectively. 
 
 
EMPIRICAL APPLICATION AND RESULTS 
 
To examine the potential effects of crop insurance on farm economic structure 
the system of input demand and output supply equations defined in equation (3) with 
the homogeneity conditions are estimated using Nebraska county level data for the 
time period 1980-1997.  The nonlinear estimates of the Translog function imposing 
homogeneity and symmetry in system of outputs supply and input demand equations 
independently are presented in Table 1. 
Under the null hypothesis, with degrees of freedom equal to number of 
restrictions, Hick neutral technical change is tested using the likelihood ratio test 
statistic
4.  The null hypothesis is examined by estimating system of input demand and   9
output supply equations for an unrestricted and restricted model.  With the likelihood 
ratio test we are unable to reject the Hicks neutral technical change at a 5% level of 
significance.  The necessary and sufficient conditions for monotonicity are violated 
given that the cost and revenue shares should be equal to one. 
The estimates from the system of input demand and output supply equations 
presented in Table 1 indicate the crop specific dummies for premiums and indemnities 
did not have a statistically significant effect on the factor use or output production mix 
for the time period 1980-1997.  Further the premium dummies had a negative effect 
while the indemnities had a positive effect on the input and output share equations.  
These results indicate with increased participation or purchase of crop insurance 
premiums, will have a negative but insignificant impact on capital, labor, chemicals 
and other inputs.  This negative sign on the chemical input indicates, with increased 
crop insurance less of chemicals will be applied implying the existence of moral 
hazard. 
Overall the empirical county level analysis of Nebraska agriculture sector 
aggregate data from 1980-1997 indicate potential impacts of crop insurance on the 
farm economic structure but not significant.  This is based on the estimation of input 
demand and the output supply functions accounting for premiums and indemnities.  A 
more through investigation of estimating individually insured crop’s acreage and 
premiums purchased would provide clear and robust impacts due to crop insurance on 
factor use.  Further simultaneous estimation of system of input demand and output 
supply equations along with the profit function would provide the detailed impact 
analysis of the potential impacts of crop insurance premium on the factor use as well 
as shifts in the crop production mix.   10
CONCLUSIONS 
 
This paper examines the potential impacts of crop insurance on county level 
Nebraska agriculture sector based on the system of input demand and the system of 
output supply equations using a profit function for the time period 1980-1997.  The 
likelihood ratio tests fail to reject the hypothesis of Hick-neutral technical change in 
both inputs and outputs for the same time period.  So under Hicks-neutral technical 
change, the overall impacts of crop insurance on agriculture sector based on the 
system of input demand and output supply equation even though indicate correct signs 
on the coefficient estimates, are not statistically significant. 
Further research needs to be explored based on longer time series and 
disaggregate input data to isolate the crop wise impacts of crop insurance on the farm 
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FOOTNOTES 
                                                 
1  The crop wise analysis is consequential and renders pertinent information, however the 
difficulty associated with this type of analysis is two-fold.  First, the unavailability of crop wise 
allocable input quantity and price data, second is the lack of sufficient time series.  More over at the 
producer level, the analysis would be binding due to the truncation of the indemnities received (i.e., 
positive (zero) if the producer takes (does not take) a hit) and premiums paid (participation rates, i.e., 
positive (zero) if the producer buys (does not buy) insurance).  Further given the availability of crop 
insurance premiums, indemnities and subsidies at the aggregate level, which suits our needs to examine 
the aggregate effects of crop insurance. 
 
2   Even with producer level since we do not known a priori the producers expected yield at the 
time of purchasing insurance.  So a proxy for the producers expected yield is the 4-10 year moving 
average of the producers yield given the availability of up to 10 years data.  A similar approach is 
followed with aggregate data to disaggregating the premiums paid and indemnities received into price 
and quantity data, based on the expected yield, percent election and indemnity trigger. 
 
3  Since under the separable output-input assumption, to examine the system of output supply 
functions the revenue function (outputs are exogenous with given input) rather than profit function 
(both inputs and outputs are endogenous) is appropriate. 
 
4   The likelihood ratio test statistic is –2 [restricted model – (–unrestricted model)] and is chi-
squared, with the degrees of freedom equal to the number of restrictions imposed. 